

11/1/64-247  
13 October 1964

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## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: AMALUG-1 operation  
[Briefing in Guatemala of [redacted]]

24

1. The briefing was held in a small luxurious government conference room on the afternoon of Friday 9 October 1964, lasting about 2 1/2 hours. [redacted]

08,06

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[redacted] attended for the Guate- 11  
[redacted] of our Station were  
present. 03, 03, 16-2

27,03

2. At the request of the [redacted] (CIC, Paul Webb) I prefaced the operational briefing with a brief description of how the U.S. intelligence community operates, of the role of CIA, of the need for compartmentation and security, and specifically of how the foregoing considerations make it imperative for the [Guatemalans] to adopt security precautions which will ensure that the information we provide and the [joint operations] we undertake are compartmented 24 within the Guatemalan government (and, in fact, discussed by the Guatemalan government exclusively with our representatives in the field). 24

3. Following the introductory remarks outlined above, I briefed the group on the DCI structure, the DCI operational techniques, and specifically on DCI aims and operations in [Guatemala]. The [redacted] lent close attention throughout the briefing and examined the exhibits closely, including the DCI intelligence requirements [for Guatemala 24 and the [redacted]].

4. After the foregoing exposition, I explained 24 our aims in exploiting the information with regard to the [redacted] aspect [redacted] control [redacted] 24 [redacted] In this connection I asked for close cooperation 24 and coordination of activities, promising that we shall do our utmost and making reference to our (travel lists 24 and watch list.)

24 3. With reference to the [redacted] case, because  
of the developments and plans [redacted] explained  
briefly the status of the [redacted] and the possibility,  
24 [of his being transferred to Guatemala] (This was in line  
with the discussion [redacted] which included our Chief 27  
of station [redacted] and the [redacted] 306  
advisor, Colonel ALFONSO.) I asked that the Guatemalan 24  
government take no action unless requested by [redacted]  
[redacted] or Colonel ALFONSO and said that, [redacted] 24  
is transferred, one of our people probably would talk to  
24 [redacted] in Guatemala.)

24 6. The [redacted] 24 made a rather  
impassioned speech in which he covered the following points:

- a. His own long experience in the OAS, in Cuba  
and in Central America;
- b. His early warnings about Castro--which  
were disregarded;
- 24 c. The extent to which Guatemala has lived up  
to its obligations in the OAS; to which it has  
24 [cooperated] in efforts [redacted] against Castro; and to  
which it has looked toward U.S. leadership;
- d. The failure of the U.S. to take aggressive  
action against Cuba and the need for taking a  
hard line, including the use of force in support of  
military activity by the free Cubans and the other  
American countries;
- e. His appreciation that the Soviets will not be  
willing to risk a nuclear war over Cuba;
- f. Condemnation of Mexico for her dealings with  
Cuba, for failure to abide by her obligations in  
the OAS, and for permitting the Castroites to  
operate out of Mexico against other American  
countries;
- g. The need for action against Mexico;

h. The effectiveness of his own actions against guerrillas in Guatemala and his determination to "meet violence with violence;"

i. Recognition of the importance of the information covered in the briefing, and of its exploitation;

j. Reference to the case of the [redacted] working for Cuban intelligence and now detained in Guatemala [redacted]

k. Acceptance of security restrictions and his decision to hold the information to those present.

7. In replying to the remarks of [redacted] I said that we appreciate the cooperation of Guatemala in the OAS and that we shall be most interested in the exploitation of the possibilities in the present case. I added that the matter of using force against Cuba is a policy matter on which I was not competent to comment but that the decisions made by the United States Government are based on careful study of detailed information including information on Soviet intentions and capabilities.

8. At the conclusion of the meeting, [redacted] asked for a copy of the LCI requirements (which he already had gone over closely) and took the copy with him to study further.

Harold E. Swenson  
Chief, WH/SA/CI

SECRET

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